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The past year held many challenges for microfinance: not since the Asian crisis of the late 1990s has the sector faced a more difficult economic environment. Yet despite these conditions, most microfinance institutions (MFIs) proved to be up to the challenge.
Beginning in January 2009, MFI portfolio delinquency levels began to deteriorate rapidly, with loans past due over 30 days (portfolio at risk [PAR30] ) jumping from a median of 2.2 percent to 4.7 percent during the first five months of 2009, while profitability dropped from a median return on equity (ROE) of nearly 18 percent at year-end 2008 to 6 percent by May 2009. 2 However, since June 2009 delinquency has moderated and profitability levels have come back to stabilize at 4 percent for PAR30 and 10 percent for ROE, respectively. Most MFIs continue to maintain solid reserve and capitalization levels, with equity ratios unchanged from the 18-20 percent range established over the past two years.
The effects of the downturn were also far from uniform. While Central America, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia were particularly hard hit, large areas in South America and South Asia have witnessed little or no impact. At the same time, a few countries (Nicaragua, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Morocco) have experienced severe delinquency crises but for reasons not directly related to the global downturn.
Against this backdrop, and to our surprise, microfinance equity valuations globally have continued to rise. MFIs in the private equity market traded at a median of 2.1x book value-a 62 percent increase since 2007 that reflects sustained demand for microfinance equity. The sector also continued to attract a larger pool of capital, with Blue Orchard, Microvest, and Developing World Markets all establishing new microfinance equity funds in 2009, while public investors significantly increased their commitments to microfinance.
India in particular has been showing unusually high valuations, with large MFIs trading at nearly 6x their book value, or nearly 3x the global median. While the recent impressive growth of Indian MFIs is expected to continue, in our view their current and future earnings expectations do not justify such high multiples.
Globally, the microfinance private equity market is still young and lacking in performance benchmarks. However, our statistical analysis of private transactions shows that age, income growth, and asset quality are significant drivers of valuations.
had already rebounded to precrisis levels and are back at their historical peak. Our sample of eight LIFIs did not experience a significant deterioration in the asset quality of their microcredit portfolios and are continuing to expand in their respective markets. However, LIFIs still trade at a discount of 13-23 percent compared to emerging market banks.
Outlook for 2010
While the effects of high delinquency will continue to be felt, most MFIs around the world will likely continue to expand their client reach, though at a slower rate and with improved risk management. Equity valuation will continue to attract the interest of both public and commercial investors, while local banks are likely to step up their strategic acquisition of MFIs. In addition, the potential initial public offering (IPO) in 2010 of SKS-the largest MFI in India-should be a key milestone and set the stage for future IPOs in the sector. Despite current market uncertainties, we believe the medium-term outlook for equity investments in microfinance will remain positive. Source: CGAP. P/E = price-to-earnings ratio; P/BV = price-to-book-value ratio. 
Introduction
The upheaval that hit mainstream financial markets and the reverberations that continue to be felt across the globe from the resulting economic crisis impacted MFIs and their clients. The early stages of the downturn saw MFIs experience significant liquidity shortages, but as the capital markets recovered, concerns turned from funding to asset quality.
Rising delinquencies were paralleled by an equally strong decline in profitability, and although a minority of MFIs found themselves in serious distress, most have settled at levels that are high by historical standards but not alarming from the perspective of losses.
Amid the turmoil, the still-nascent microfinance equity market continues to be active, with 42 transactions reported between September 2008 and September 2009. The vast majority of equity transactions are still in the form of private placements, with only two pure microfinance IPOs to date (Compartamos Banco and Equity Bank) and another expected in India in 2010 (SKS).
Microfinance has been attracting interest from a growing pool of investors over the last few years, with both development finance institutions (DFIs) and private investors boosting their commitment to the asset class despite the absence of reliable market benchmarks on microfinance equity performance.
Responding to this knowledge gap, this Occasional Paper aims to shed new light on equity valuation trends in microfinance, which must necessarily begin with a detailed examination of how MFIs have coped during the recent economic crisis. Accordingly, the first part of the paper is devoted to MFI asset quality and its impact on microfinance profitability.
Next, we examine trends in valuation benchmarks for microfinance private equity transactions and analyze the key drivers behind these valuations. This section also delves into the recent growth in transaction volume and valuation multiples in India, which had a particularly active market in 2009.
Finally, we seek to place the microfinance equity market within the context of the broader equity market, using comparisons with publicly listed LIFIs in developing countries. 
Asset Quality Concerns
The microfinance sector earned its reputation as a countercyclical industry in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, displaying relative resilience during the tumult of that period and in the years following. This reputation was burnished by a series of studies that included a review of the performance of Bank Rakyat Indonesia during the height of the Asian crisis (Patten et al. 2001) and econometric analyses of MFI performance during the six to eight years that followed (Krauss and Walter 2008 and Gonzalez 2007) . Events of the last 12 months have led some to question this reputation as MFI asset quality and profit performance deteriorated amid the global economic slump.
Though a majority of MFIs felt the impact of the global economic slump, it did not affect all of them equally. Most MFIs saw their delinquencies rise sharply in the first half of 2009, with a parallel slide in profitability. However, there were significant deviations from this general trend: some MFIs with pre-existing vulnerabilities, such as uncontrolled growth, poor credit methodology, and weak internal controls, found themselves dealing with crisis-level situations and heavy losses. At the same time, MFIs in a number of microfinance markets, including India and Bolivia, showed no significant signs of deterioration.
The rise in delinquency is notable for both its breadth and pace, having taken place during the first five months of the year. Data since June 2009
Box 3: Data Sources on Asset Quality
The lack of available data poses a challenge when analyzing asset quality. If we use the Lehman bankruptcy as the symbolic beginning of the financial crisis (15 September 2008), its impact was not yet reflected in the widely used industry database maintained by MIX, which compiles only end-of-year data, which are subject to a reporting time lag. Thus, although MIX provides a comprehensive data set of 1,500 institutions, only December 2008 data, which do not reflect current market conditions, were available for our analysis.
As a result, we rely extensively on data provided by Swiss microfinance investment intermediary Symbiotics, which collects detailed monthly reports of 50 MFIs (Sym50). This data set has significant differences with MIX, yet we believe their similarities are sufficient to rely on the more current reporting of Sym50 as a predictor for year-end 2009 numbers that will become available from MIX later this year.
One important difference is the definition of PAR30: while MIX combines both past due and restructured loans in the numerator, Sym50 includes only the former. The two numbers are thus only partially comparable, though restructured loans are significantly lower and thus only moderately affect the comparisons. Sym50 also has a notably different geographic distribution from MIX, with a heavy focus on South America, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia but with no MFI data from South Asia and Africa. Nevertheless, though it may reflect only a subset of the broader microfinance market, we believe Sym50 is fairly representative of the types of MFIs that normally receive investments from commercial sources, since these regions feature well-established microfinance markets with low barriers to foreign investment. Moreover, Sym50 is heavily weighted toward equity investment targets-banks and NBFIs-that comprise 75 percent of this data set.
It seems reasonable to assume that when yearend 2009 numbers are compiled for the broader benchmarks, the asset deterioration in the focus regions predicted by Sym50 will be reflected in MIX year-end figures. Figure B3 .1 shows a comparison of Sym50, with different segments of MIX benchmarks, some reweighted to reflect the former's geographic distribution. Although the two data sets share a strong similarity in PAR trends and absolute levels, MIX benchmarks for NBFIs and banks, when adjusted for the geographic weightings described above, align especially closely to Sym50.
However, South and Southeast Asia have consistently shown delinquency rates below the global benchmarks since year-end 2006, and we expect this divergence to be evident in 2009 MIX data as well.
(Box continues on next page)
Box 3 (continued)
Asset Quality Measures
Asset quality measures provide a view of loan portfolio quality and dictate loss provisioning levels at financial institutions. The definitions below reflect different aspects of asset quality.
Portfolio at Risk. PAR is the value of all loans outstanding that have one or more payments of interest or principal past due by more than a specified number of days (e.g., PAR30 = loans past due > 30 days). The reported amount includes the balance of unpaid principal, expressed as a percentage of gross loan portfolio, that is, including all current, delinquent, and renegotiated loans, but excluding write-offs. This is the definition used in Sym50. Note that the MIX definition of PAR adds to the numerator the unpaid principal of loans that have been restructured or rescheduled.
Restructured/Rescheduled/Reprogrammed Loans. Loans for which the payment schedule, the interest rate, and/or the outstanding principal amounts has or have been renegotiated with the borrower.
Write-Offs. Write-offs are loans that are deemed unrecoverable and written off the balance sheet. From an accounting standpoint, a write-off reduces the loan book on the assets side and loan-loss reserves on the liabilities side. If reserves are not sufficient to cover for the loss in loans, equity is impaired. Write-offs can be expressed in absolute terms and as a percentage of outstanding gross loans. suggest that the rapid decline in asset quality has largely stabilized. Absent a relapse and a further downturn in asset quality, we believe the sector as a whole will emerge from the storm generally intact. Partly as a result of conservative loss reserve practices before the crisis, most MFIs appear to have sufficient provisions to absorb write-offs, which we expect to continue to increase through early 2010, but then moderate and possibly reverse in the second half of the year.
Unprecedented Drop in Asset Quality in 2009
At the onset of the crisis, most of the concern about MFIs related to the continued availability of funding, but MFIs quickly eased their growth rates, which, along with the public commitment of a number of leading investors to maintain their support for the sector, helped avoid many potential liquidity problems. As a result, the concerns of many investors and practitioners turned from funding to the deteriorating asset quality seen in a number of MFIs. Such levels of delinquency directly impact profitability, especially for those MFIs that are used to seeing far lower numbers. 3 That said, while current delinquency levels for any given MFI are a source of concern, the more pertinent issue is that, at the country-level, the situation of over US$1 million in assets had a 1-5% chance of failing during a three-year period. An MFI that reported PAR30 >5% had a 6-10% chance of failure, while one with PAR30 >10% would fail 10-15% of the time.
Rapid declines in asset quality
witnessed in the first semester of 2009 is unknown territory for most young microfinance markets.
4
Deterioration is not uniform
Looked at more closely, the Sym50 index appears to reflect two different yet complementary stories. On the one hand, there is significant broad-based decline in MFI portfolio performance from January to June 2009. However, there is also significant country-level variation at both ends of the spectrum ( Figure 2 ).
While most MFIs have experienced significant asset deterioration, MFIs in countries such as Bolivia, Egypt, Kosovo, and most of India are demonstrating little change in asset quality and profitability. The differences are apparent at the regional level as well, with South America relatively stable while Eastern Europe and Central Asia have seen extensive asset quality declines.
The situation is particularly difficult in three countries-Nicaragua, Morocco, and Bosnia and Herzegovina-where most MFIs have been dealing with large-scale borrower delinquencies. While there may be a couple of possible explanations for this, our initial hypothesis is that in these countries the economic crisis hit a sector that had already been weakened by factors such as unhealthy competition, overstretched MFI capacity, and loss of credit discipline. In these cases, the economic downturn was not the causative factor, though it was a critical aggravating variable, turning already ailing markets into full-blown crises.
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Such MFI-and country-level differences are also evident in how MFIs have been using restructured loans. The levels of divergence between median and average figures in Figure 3 suggest that while short-term delinquency (expressed through PAR30) is relatively evenly distributed around the median, reprogrammed loans are heavily weighted toward a minority of particularly distressed MFIs, with the rest reporting only minimal levels of reprogramming. This supports the hypothesis that most MFIs are dealing with elevated but still controllable delinquency levels. At the same time, a minority of MFIs are in distress and are taking remedial action, including extensive loan rescheduling, to get out of their predicament. Indeed, while increased rescheduling can sometimes signal MFIs attempting to artificially reduce PAR, the technique has proven to be an important instrument for distressed MFIs during previous crises.
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Is the worst over?
Recent trends in portfolio performance point to a possible bottoming out of the downturn. Since May 2009, when the global PAR30 delinquency rate peaked at 4.7 percent, asset quality has actually moderated slightly, having settled at around 4 percent through the three months starting in September ( Figure 1 ). The lagging indicator PAR180 is still climbing and is likely to peak in early 2010. The situation has stabilized at historically high rates of delinquency, with an inevitable impact on profitability.
Rapid, But Limited, Decline in Profitability
If there is a surprise on the returns side, it is that profitability has not been affected more. In fact, Figure Since hitting bottom in mid-2009, profitability has rebounded slightly, with ROE settling at around 10 percent-about half the level recorded over the two preceding years. However, in the short term, the high delinquency rate will likely keep profitability depressed until asset quality returns to historical levels.
MFI Capital Is Still Relatively Safe
When the crisis hit, most MFIs were able to maintain their capital base largely because of the relatively high loss reserves they had maintained prior to 2009. But reserves are diminishing significantly: as with ROA, the median coverage ratio of PAR30 Since then, loss reserves have rebounded in line with the moderation in PAR, but still at significantly lower levels from before, settling at around 110 percent of PAR30. Despite this softening, with the current levels of delinquency, existing loss reserves should be fully sufficient for most MFIs to cover eventual losses without having to impair their equity ( Figure 7 ). 7 Moreover, solvency is generally not a concern as most MFIs remain very well capitalized, with median equity levels not having However, while these capitalization levels should give confidence, they would not necessarily apply to all MFIs. Some countries are also generally more exposed than others, with India, for example, having a particularly low equity cushion and high financial leverage. The current focus of MFIs on resolving their asset quality issues along with the commitment on the part of investors to tackle problems instead of cutting losses and pulling out makes us optimistic about the sector's medium-term outlook. The watershed events of the past year may have caught the sector unawares, but it has proved to be largely up to the challenge.
13

Valuation of Private Equity Transactions-MFIs
It is natural to expect the significant deterioration in both asset quality and profitability at MFIs to be reflected in the valuation of MFI equity and transactions. Remarkably, this is not the case, and indeed in some markets, most notably India, there are signs of equity valuations outstripping fundamental benchmarks. 
Multiples are increasing across all regions
The regional breakdown of valuations (Table 7) shows Source: CGAP. NA = fewer than five transactions. P/E = price-to-earnings ratio; P/BV = price-to-book-value ratio; ECA = Eastern Europe and Central Asia; LAC = Latin America and Caribbean. Another reason for the continued rise in microfinance valuations is the relatively strong asset quality indicators for MFIs receiving equity 9 Africa had to be dropped from this graph because the yearly number of transactions was too low to be presented. 10 Good asset quality appears to be a precondition for attracting equity investments.
Indeed, most transactions reported to CGAP after September 2008 occurred in resilient markets with good portfolio quality, such as India. Our data set shows no transactions in the three worst hit markets-Nicaragua, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Morocco-and very few transactions involving distressed MFIs.
Our analysis indicates that higher delinquency (expressed as PAR30) exacted a hefty discount on valuation multiples. Our regression model (see Appendix II) shows a significant negative correlation between PAR30 and expected priceto-earnings multiples, controlling for a variety of factors, including geographic location, profitability, and transaction value.
Asset Quality, Net Income Growth, and Age of the MFI Drive Valuations
Profitability does not seem to drive valuations
In mature private equity markets, book value multiples are positively correlated to return on equity. Figure 12 presents the current price-tobook-value multiples of 150 banks across the world covered by J.P. Morgan against the expected average ROE for 2009-2010. ROE appears to drive price-to-book-value multiples, with a strong correlation coefficient of 70 percent. Source: J.P. Morgan estimates, using the relation between return on equity (ROE) and price-to-book-value (P/BV) multiples, as described in Figure 12 . We highlight the lines corresponding to an ROE of 14% and a P/BV multiple of 5.9x, as those are the figures corresponding to the Indian microfinance market.
However, this relationship does not hold true in our sample of MFIs. Plotting price-to-book-value and profitability as done in Table 9 and Figure  13 shows no relationship between these two measures, indicating again a lack of consensus on MFI valuations (see Appendix II for details on the regression model). MFIs in Eastern Europe and Africa are trading at the same level of 1.9x price-to-book-value while the average ROE for Africa MFIs is 1.5 percent and 15.6 percent for Eastern Europe MFIs. Investors do not appear to put too much weight on current ROE but are looking at other factors, such as growth in earnings and market size.
Net income growth is a key driver of valuation
Price-to-earnings multiples are positively correlated with income growth as demonstrated in Table 10 and Figure 14 . Investors assign a clear premium to earnings growth prospects. However, this analysis does not take into account the effect of equity dilution on valuation. 
Size of bubbles: Total MFI assets in 2008
Premium for younger MFIs
Investors pay higher multiples for younger MFIs. Our regression analysis (see Appendix II) shows that this trend is broad-based and stable across earnings and book multiples. It is important to note that this analysis is already controlling for size of the institution, which is highly positively correlated to valuations. Investors appear to place a premium on an institution's growth potential. Younger MFIs tend to grow faster than their more established counterparts. Moreover, new and more commercially oriented MFIs tend to have professional management and more aggressive growth models.
To summarize, asset quality, net income growth, and age of the MFIs are the main drivers of price as demonstrated by our statistical analysis. However, we recognize that other drivers of valuation should be taken into account by investors, such as the size of the transaction, the country where the MFI is located, its legal status, current profitability, cost structure, financial leverage, and funding base.
The Case of India: High Valuations in a Dynamic Market
India has been a major market for private equity transactions this year, accounting for over 30 percent of the transactions in our sample. Even more surprisingly, microfinance appears to be the dominant target for private equity in India, with MFIs having comprised 40 percent of all private equity transactions in the country during the past two years (Bhadra 2009 ). Perhaps this should not be unexpected, given the high growth rates of Indian MFIs and the still very large market potential.
India has great potential for microfinance
India presents the single largest microfinance market in the world, with over 600 million people living below $1.50 a day, while the combined MFI and self-help group (SHG) market serves only an estimated 67 million borrowers today (Srinivasan 2009 
But current valuation levels are cause for concern
In 2009, Indian MFIs have been sold on the private equity market at a median of 5.9x book value versus 2.1x globally. In our view, such high valuations of Indian MFIs are difficult to justify:
Current profitability is a moderate 14 1. percent and relies on high leverage. Our analysis of the relationship between price-tobook and ROE suggests that, to justify the current valuations, the average ROE of Indian MFIs should stand around 45 percent (Table  8) . However, microfinance NBFIs in India are generating a median ROE of only 14.4 percent, 13,14 with the largest five institutions 11 Note that the 67 million clients reported include significant double-counting of multiple borrowers, so the number of potential clients with no access to microfinance is even higher than these number imply. 12 MIX benchmarks 2008 adjusted data (http://mixmarket.org/mfi/benchmarks). 13 MIX benchmarks 2008 unadjusted data. 14 A high level of ROE would in fact allow the bank to grow its book value per share at a high pace, which would naturally decrease the price-to-book-value multiple over time. This is the case of Compartamos, which enjoyed a very high average ROE of 43% in 2009. Its current price-to-book multiple of 6.7x is therefore prone to decrease as the bank grows its book value by 32% over the next three years, according to J.P. share of these flows comes from investors whose objective is to realize profits by floating or otherwise exiting their investments in a relatively short time frame. In many cases in the past (such as during the dot com bubble in the 1990s), this type of capital has produced overvaluation of equity prices in the short term and disappointment in the long term.
Although our analysis suggests a market dominated by high-valuation transactions, we recognize that our data set is limited and may not be representative of all MFI equity deals in India.
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A number of domestic microfinance investors, such as SIDBI, are active in the equity market, and we believe they are investing at lower valuations. Moreover, there are still attractive social investment opportunities in India in small and medium-size MFIs in underserved regions, although their capital absorption capacity is limited due the growing market dominance of the larger players.
Developments in India should be watched by all microfinance investors. Given India's market presence, its potential impact could be felt across the entire microfinance sector.
Valuation of Public TransactionsLow-Income Finance Institutions
The private market for MFI equity transactions having shown remarkable resilience in the face of deteriorating asset quality and profitability, one needs also to examine the broader context of the publicly listed market for guidance on future trends. As the pool of listed MFIs is extremely limited, this means comparing to other, similar, institutions.
In this section we look at valuation trends for LIFIs in the public markets. LIFIs may not necessarily share the double-bottom-line business model of most MFIs, but they operate in the same markets, providing financial services (consumer and microenterprise loans, payments, and insurance) to lower income segments of the population. As such, they offer interesting comparables to MFIs. We have identified eight such institutions.
In this section we examine answers to the following questions about asset quality and stock price performance of LIFIs in the context of the global crisis:
How 
The Strength of Bank Capital Varies by Country
Despite the recent spike in NPLs, the delinquency rates of the two banking systems analyzed in this section (Mexico and Indonesia) remained at historically low levels. This is different from the results for MFIs in the first part of this paper, for which delinquency rates had reached historical highs.
The NPL ratio of Compartamos at 2.3 percent in September 2009 remains below the banking system average of 3.0 percent in Mexico. Moreover, this ratio of 3.0 percent for Mexican banks is well below levels seen at the beginning of the decade (when NPLs reached 15 percent), as shown in Figure  20 . Similarly, the NPL ratio of Indonesian banks decreased during the decade from 18.8 percent at the end of 2000 to 4.3 percent in September 2009.
To assess the soundness of the two banking systems, we analyze their coverage ratios of past due loans (defined as loan-loss reserves to past due loans). The average coverage ratio for Mexico 
Definition of the LIFI Index
The LIFI Index groups eight publicly listed institutions, including banks and NBFIs, that provide financial services to the lower income demographic. It is a market cap-weighted index, covering various geographies and business models. The index includes institutions based on four criteria: (1) the LIFI offers mostly financial services and targets the lower income segments of the population; (2) it is publicly listed on an exchange; (3) financial information is easily available; and (4) its stock has good daily liquidity.
The index includes banks that are not exclusively offering working capital loans to microentrepreneurs, broadening the scope to include consumer loans. The selected LIFIs are BRI, Danamon, Compartamos, Financiera Independencia, African Bank, IPF, First Cash Financial, and Panamericano. We note that two LIFIs, First Cash and Panamericano, have been added to this year's edition of the index, in order to expand its scope.
First Cash Financial is the second largest pawn shop operator in Mexico and the third largest in the United States. It is a hybrid, short-term, fully collateralized consumer lender and a deep discount retailer of forfeited collateral. The bank had US$279 million in total assets as of September 2009. It is listed on Nasdaq and sees trading volume averaging US$4.0 million daily.
Banco Panamericano is a regulated bank in Brazil that offers consumer lending. The bank had US$5.9 billion in total assets as of September 2009 and US$4.5 billion in total loans. Its loan portfolio breaks down into 55 percent auto loans, 24 percent credit cards, and 13 percent payroll-deducted loans. The average loan size is US$4,000. The company is listed on the Sao Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) and has an average daily trading volume of US$2.8 million.
The LIFI Index outperformed mainstream banks and is trading 1 percent below its peak in 2007
A review of the historical performance of the index shows strong performance against emerging market banks and mainstream banks in global markets.
In Figure 21 , we back-tested the index since Moreover, the LIFI Index trades at a discount to mainstream banks in terms of price-to-book multiple, in spite of having a higher average ROE at 22 percent in 2010e-11e versus 19 percent for mainstream banks. LIFIs trade at a discount of 13 percent compared to mainstream banks, with a price-to-book value multiple of 2.6x, versus 3.0x for mainstream banks. 
Conclusion
A little more than one year after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, we are optimistic about the ability of the microfinance industry to rebound from the impact of the financial crisis.
At the outset of the crisis, late in 2008, the chief concern had been about a liquidity squeeze, with fears that MFIs would be unable to roll over their debt. In large part, the sector avoided this fate, as the credit market serving MFIs recovered quickly, and microfinance investors remained committed to the asset class. However, the crisis exposed some structural issues and operational weaknesses, and credit risk has now become the top concern of investors and MFIs (Lascelles 2009 ).
Some fast moving markets that had witnessed unrestrained growth in recent years, such as Nicaragua and Bosnia and Herzegovina, have been facing large-scale delinquency crises. And for the first time in the sector's 30-year history, we have witnessed a concurrent and significant decline in the asset quality of the majority of MFIs across the globe, with a parallel impact on their profitability. However, with a few significant exceptions, thus far MFIs have managed to weather this delinquency crisis reasonably well, reducing their growth, using their surplus loan-loss provisions, and keeping their capital intact.
With the downturn having apparently bottomed out in the last months of 2009, most MFIs are generally well positioned for 2010 and are likely to resume growth, though with greater awareness of risk management and more prudent growth strategies. For a few vulnerable MFIs, however,
NPLs and large numbers of restructured loans will have to be written off. This may require additional equity and significant restructuring. In a few cases, distress mergers, or even liquidations, are likely.
Looking at private equity, we believe valuations will continue to be supported by a large pool of private and public investors with a long-term commitment to the asset class. In the private market, most MFI transactions will continue to be in the range of 1.5x-2.5x book value, although some distressed MFIs urgently seeking to raise equity will likely be valued at lower multiples. Asset quality and funding structure as well as management and governance are likely to remain key concerns for investors. At the same time, we believe investors will need to be more selective in their MFI investments than in the past.
Microfinance IPOs should resume in the coming months. The expected 2010 IPO of SKS-the leading MFI in India-would be a milestone, setting the stage for future IPOs in the sector. Depending on the outcome, it is quite probable that the spotlight on the Indian microcredit sector will intensify, while triggering renewed discussion around MFIs' profitability and social impact.
The current environment may cause MFI valuations to be volatile in the near term, but we believe that the medium-term outlook for equity investments in microfinance remains positive. For those with a long-term commitment to microfinance-both financial and social-we believe 2009 will come to be seen as an important transition period, with the lessons and adjustments of the year helping the microfinance industry to lay a foundation for more solid and sustainable growth.
Appendix I: Glossary
Asset quality in this context pertains to the quality of the assets (loans) on a financial institution's balance sheet, based on the likelihood that a given loan will repay principal and interest on time. Low asset quality denotes that the institution must make provisions for eventual losses. We analyze both historical multiples (historical price-to-earnings and historical price-to-bookvalues, also called trailing multiples), and this year extend our analysis to expected (forward) multiples.
We collected around 100 individual deals during this survey cycle, of which only 56 were included in our sample. Transactions were dropped if they were executed at nominal value so that no underlying valuation process could be assumed or if they were part of loans being converted into equity. When analyzing the multiples in our sample, the following outliers were eliminated: (1) negative multiples, (2) price-to-book multiples above 10, 21 and (3) price-to-earnings multiples above 40.
Transactions that involved multiple parties, which obviously had done the valuation jointly, are treated as one single transaction. This avoids a potential bias caused by including the same transaction information several times in the database.
The multiples we show are all post-money, that is, they are based on the number of shares and financial data of the MFI after transaction. This shall not imply that post-money multiples are the industry standards. In fact, a sizable number of fund managers relies on premoney multiples for their decision making. Our aim is simply to make the transaction data comparable.
When presenting this year's data set we cut it by calendar year, with 2009 comprising the first three quarters of the year. This year we are also including expected (forward) multiples to better illustrate investors' growth expectations.
This report presents aggregates only when at least five underlying observations per aggregate were available. Cases with fewer observations are marked with "NA" throughout the report. Source: CGAP. New=0-6 years, young=6-10 years, mature=>10 years. Source: CGAP. Operating expense ratio is calculated as operating expenses divided by loans. All models are specified as (left-censored) tobit regressions and include regional dummies for Africa, Asia, and Europe and Central Asia (Latin American countries is the omitted category). Note: "+" indicates significant positive effect, "-" indicates significant negative effect, "no" indicates no significant effect. Some variables have been linearized (indicated by "log") for a better model fit.
